Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine

DigitalCommons@PCOM
PCOM Psychology Dissertations

Student Dissertations, Theses and Papers

2009

Perception of Control and Awareness of Deficit in
Individuals with Neurological Impairment in a
Clinical Sample
Donna Marie Struck
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, dms196@comcast.net

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pcom.edu/psychology_dissertations
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Struck, Donna Marie, "Perception of Control and Awareness of Deficit in Individuals with Neurological Impairment in a Clinical
Sample " (2009). PCOM Psychology Dissertations. Paper 134.

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Dissertations, Theses and Papers at DigitalCommons@PCOM. It has been
accepted for inclusion in PCOM Psychology Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@PCOM. For more information, please
contact library@pcom.edu.

Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine
Department of Psychology

PERCEPTION OF CONTROL AND
AWARENESS OF DEFICIT
IN INDIVIDUALS WITH NEUROLOGICAL IMPAIRMENT
IN A CLINICAL SAMPLE

Donna Marie Struck
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of
Doctor of Psychology
April 2009

PHILADELPHIA COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

Dissertation Approval

This is to certify that the thesis presented to us by DOlma Marie Struck on the
on the 2nd day of April, 2009, in partial fult111ment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Psychology, has been examined and is acceptable in both scholarship and
literary quality.

Committee Members' Signatures:
Christopher Royer, Psy.D., Chairperson
Beth Arburn-Davis, Psy.D.
Donald P. Masey, Psy.D.
Robert A. DiTomasso, Ph.D., ABPP, Chair, Department of Psychology

IV

Acknowledgments
I would like to first take this opportunity to thank my committee, Dr. Christopher
Royer, Dr. Donald Masey, and Dr. Beth Arburn-Davis, for their guidance, expertise, and
personal time commitment to the process of completing this dissertation. I would like to
give a special thank you to Dr. Arburn-Davis for the development of the PCADS, which
was utilized for this study. Thank you to the faculty at PC OM who contributed greatly to
my education and development as a professional in the field.
I have always felt that the road to completing one's education is a journey and for
many individuals like me, it is a life-long process not confined to the classroom or to
academics alone. I have been both fortunate and extremely blessed to have had many
individuals who not only have played a significant role in my life, but who also
contributed greatly to my personal and professional development.
Words cannot express my love and gratitude to my husband, Larry Struck, whose
continuous love and consistent support of every goal I ever set, made completing my
education possible. Thank you for being the wonderful partner that you are and for being
at my side though everything we have experienced together. I could not have done this
without your dedication, selflessness, and never-ending encouragement that always went
above and beyond the call of duty. Thank you for always believing in me, even when I
was not so sure myself!
A very special thank you to my mom, Audrey Catherine LaSala, who fostered my
inquisitiveness, encouraged my creativity, and who began reading to me even before I
could talk. Thank you, mom, for your hard work, incredible fortitude, dedication, and
love that always made me feel as though I could accomplish anything I desired.

v
Thank you to Carl and lnge Hull, my second set of "adoptive parents," who
shared their love of learning, language, creativity, and culture with "the kid down the
block." Thank you for your guidance, love and encouragement throughout those
formidable years, and for opening the many doors to opportunities that I would otherwise
have never experienced without you.
To my brother Donald LaSala, who helped to create the wonderful family
memories we share now as adults, and who helped pick up the slack while I juggled
studying, work, and busy family schedules during those more challenging times that
brought us closer together over the years.
To Arnold and Helen Lewis, my wonderful neighbors and life-long friends in
New York, thank you for all your encouragement while I was growing up, and for always
believing that I could do it. You are an integral part of our family and my life!
Thank you to my good and very close friends, Hersh Gooden, and Art and
Carolyn McGinnis, who kept me grounded and sane, safe and apart in a parallel world,
and separate from the world of academics where I could just relax and be myself. May
the wonderful friendship we share continue to grow, along with many more philosophical
and humorous discussions during our patio times and barbecues. I look forward to riding
each others' rollercoaster!
To Dr. Heather Miller, Dr. Gwen Rock, and Dr. Wanda Mandell, my good
friends, now turned colleagues, who started on this journey with me. Thank you for your
support, friendship and encouragement throughout the years that we wondered would
ever come to an end. Last but not least, thank you to Marie Weil, right behind us in this
process, for her friendship and caring spirit over the years that we've been friends. I look

VI

forward to working with all of you in the future, as our lives continue to grow and
develop in the field of psychology.

VB

ABSTRACT
Acquired brain injury is considered to be one of the most important public health
concerns in the United States, with approximately 1.2 million adults that meet the criteria
for chronic brain disease, brain disorder, or injury each year. Medical costs directly
related to injury, in addition to the indirect costs related to job loss, totaled an estimated
60 billion dollars in the year 2000. Subsequent impairment following brain injmy yields a
complicated neurobehavioral sequelae of deficits. Anosognosia, specifically, the deticit
of the patient's inability to acknowledge, or even recognize impairments, is common
following brain injury. In a review of the literature, this study examined the phenomenon
of anosognosia, and its relationship to an individual's perception of control Both the
Perception of Control Across Domains Scale (PCADS) and the Neurological Impairment
Scale (NIS) were utilized as a measure of self-report, and compared with the patient's test
scores on standardized neuropsychological measures. Findings concluded that patients do
not reliably report their symptoms. Although the study's findings revealed no significant
correlations, implications for the field of psychology are still useful. The rising costs of
healthcare have contributed to the problem of insmance companies attempting to
eliminate the coverage for nemopsychological testing, in favor of conducting a clinical
interview. These findings suggest that clinicians cannot rely solely on patient report to
determine an accurate diagnosis.
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Learning is finding out what you already know.
Doing is demonstrating that you know it.
Teaching is reminding others that they know just as well as you.
You are all learners, doers, and teachers.
~

Richard Bach ~
Illusions
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Incidence and Prevalence of Adult-Onset Brain Impairment

There are approximately 1.2 million individuals between the ages of 18 and older
who meet the criteria for an adult onset of a chronic brain disease or brain disorder in the
United States each year (FCA, 2001). The incidence of adults who currently live with
impairments as a result of acquired brain disorders range from between 13.3 to 16.1
million (FCA, 2001). Statistics compiled by the Family Caregiver Alliance (2001)
reported high and low end estimates of the major causes of brain disorders in adulthood.
These include, but are not limited to, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (20,000 to 30,000);
Epilepsy (1,984,000 to 2,000,000); HIV (AIDS) Dementia (14,537 to 58,150);
Huntington's Disease (approximately 30,000); Multiple Sclerosis (250,000 to 350,000);
Parkinson's Disease (500,000 to 1,500,000), and strokes (4,000,000 to 4,400,000).
Many of the abovementioned diseases and subsequent brain impairments are
progressive, and in some cases, the incidence and prevalence increase with age (CDC,
2006b; FCA, 2001). It is estimated that 35.8% ofindividuals who are ages 84 or older
experience moderate to severe memory impailment, and approximately 4,000,000
individuals are diagnosed with probable Alzheimer's disease (FCA, 2001). Given the
increasing longevity of our growing population, it is expected that the prevalence and
incidence of brain disease and disorders will increase proportionately (FCA, 2001). By
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the year 2020, it is predicted that, in the state of California alone, there will be
approximately one million individuals over the age of 85 who will be diagnosed with
brain-related impairment; this is twice as many as there are today (FCA, 2001).
The body of literature addressing traumatic brain injury and its resultant acquired
cognitive deficits continues to grow (FCA, 1998). The scope of occurrences which result
in traumatic brain injuries is broad, and its resultant deficits are vast. Such occurrences
include, but are not limited to, impacts related to falls, head trauma due to car accidents,
penetration wounds such as gunshots, injury from surgical procedures, or oxygen
deprivation (FCA, 1998). More recent statistics cited by the Center for Disease Control
(2006b) reported that approximately 28% of brain injuries resulted from falls; 20%
occurred from motor vehicle-traffic accidents; 19% resulted from strike or impact events
and 11 % resulted from assaults.
It has been stated that from 1.6 to 3.8 million individuals who sustain sports or

recreational-related injuries will result in what is considered a mild traumatic brain
injury, or concussion (FCA, 2001). In addition to trauma, the American Brain Tumor
Association (2008) reports that more than 190,000 individuals are diagnosed with brain
tumors each year. Approximately 44,000 are primary brain tumors; approximately
150,000 are metastatic. Recent statistics reported prevalence rates of individuals living
with primary brain tumors are estimated at approximately 359,000 (American Brain
Tumor Association, 2008).

2
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Statement of the Problem

Acquired brain injury is considered to be an important public health concern
because of its incidence rate, not to mention its significant impact on an individual's daily
functioning (Vickery, Gontkovsky & Caroselli, 2005). During the year 2000, medical
costs directly related to brain injuries, and the indirect costs related to loss of
productivity, totaled an estimated 60 billion dollars in the United States (CDC, 2006b).
The resultant cognitive impairment on insult to the brain produces significant
long-term consequences (FCA, 2001). According to statistics from the Center for Disease
Control (2006b), an estimated 62.3 per 100,000 individuals who sustained head injuries
suffered enduring functional impairment (FCA, 1998); approximately 5.3 million
individuals would then require lifelong assistance with daily living activities. There are
an estimated 330,000 individuals who have sustained head injuries significant enough to
require hospitalization, with approximately 99,000 injuries which resulted in long-term
disability (FCA 1998).
The subsequent impairment because of a brain insult contributes to a complicated
array ofneurobehavioral deficits (Sherer et aI., 1998c; Sherer et aI., 2003). Patients may
exhibit any combination and magnitude of medical, physical and cognitive deficits
(Flashman et aI., 2005; Sherer, Oden, Bergloff, Levin & High, 1998) affecting the
domains of language, thinking, learning, emotions, behaviors, and sensation (CDC,
2006b). Approximately 40 percent of individuals who are hospitalized with brain injuries
require remediation for memory improvement, problem solving, managing stress and
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emotional regulation, including controlling one's temper, and improving job skills (CDC,
2006b).
Prigatano (1999) found that with each successive stage after brain injury, patients
often exhibited a disturbance in consciousness which altered their perceptions of their
changes in personality and cognition. In addition to personality difficulties such as
irritability, restlessness, and depression, the literature reports the phenomenon of
impaired self-awareness (Sherer et aI, 2003); this impairment in self-awareness is a
common finding following brain injury (Shereer et al., 1998a).

Purpose of the Study

Because of the significant challenges facing rehabilitation specialists, the concept
of unawareness has more recently experienced resurgence in the literature (Bogod, 2003;
FIashman & McAllister, 2002; Martelli et al., 2000; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). The ability to
identify whether or not the patient was able to evaluate accurately his or her level and
severity of neurological functioning, and to self-appraise his or her perception of the
ability to manage his or her environment following brain injury, may serve as a useful
component both in clinical and in rehabilitative settings.
Despite speculation and theory over the previous century, and given the
heterogeneity of the concept, there still exists a poor understanding of impaired
awareness (Vuilleumier, 2004). The need for a more comprehensive understanding of the
underlying mechanism of self-awareness in contributing to poor self-perception
following traumatic brain injury remains a critical topic for discussion (Prigatano, 1996).
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The issue of the patient's lack of awareness of deficit across a wide variety of
domains is one that is dealt with daily by practicing neuropsychologists (Bigler &
Clement, 1997). The purpose of this study is to explore patients' subjective self-rep011s
on two structured checklists, in order to determine whether or not there is a relationship
between 1) the accurate patient report of level of severity of symptoms; and 2) the
patient's ability to perceive control over his or her behaviors and environment, when
compared with actual test scores as measured by standardized neuropsychological
assessment
The first checklist, (the Perceived Control Across Domains Scale [PCADSJ), is a
self-repo11 measure of how well the patient perceives control over different domains in
life following brain injury or following an acquired brain disease or disorder. The second
checldist, (the Neuropsychological Impairment Scale [NIS]), allowed the patient to rate
his or her subjective experience and severity of neuropsychological symptoms following
brain injury or an acquired brain disease or disorder.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Defining the concept of impaired self-awareness

Impaired self-awareness, also known commonly in the literature as anosognosia,
is defined as the patient's partial or complete unawareness of an acquired deficit
following neurological insult (Bogod, 2003; Borgaro & Prigatano, 2003; Carota, Staub &
Bogousslavsky, 2002; Flashman, 2002; Flashman et aI., 2005; Hart, Giovannetti,
Montgomery & Schwartz, 1998; Martelli, Pickett & Zaner, 2000; Sherer, et aI., 1998a).
Up to 45 percent of individuals with moderate to severe brain injuries demonstrate either
a reduced capacity for awareness, or a complete lack of awareness of their deficits
(Flashman 2002).
Stuss (1991) repOlied that patients with unawareness deficits have difficulty with
understanding the implications oftheir own actions, demonstrate a reduced capacity to
self-monitor, and exhibit dissociation between their behaviors and their thoughts.
Although the phenomenon of impaired awareness has been reported in the medical
literature for over a century (Cheng & Man, 2006), the concept has received relatively
little focus compared with other manifestations of neuropsychiatric illnesses (Flashman,
2002).
Within the clinical domain, the manifestations of impaired self-awareness
presents in various ways (Murphy, 2003). Patients seem unable to recognize the
impairment, or to acknowledge that the impairment exists; they judge the deficit to be
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inconsequential, or completely discount the existence of these deficits (Carota et al.,
2002; Flashman et al., 2005), despite observable evidence to the contrary by others such
as family members and therapists (Flashman et al., 2005).
Although studies have demonstrated the fact that patients have inaccurately
evaluated their sensory, perceptual, motor, affective and cognitive abilities following
brain injury (Orfei et al., 2007; Vuilleumier, 2004), the report of unawareness is further
complicated by the inconsistency across all types of impairments, and varies in degree
depending upon the severity of the neurological insult. During the acute period of brain
injury, some patients were completely unaware that they had sustained any injury at all
(Sherer et al., 199 8b), yet other patients reported themselves to be completely normal
with regard to their higher cognitive functioning and physical status (Flashman et al.,
2005; Prigatano & Altman, 1990).
Other studies have found that some patients were able to report only vague
behavioral symptoms, and were unable to appreciate the connection between these
impairments and their brain injuries (Prigatano, 2005). Other patients reported differences
in themselves, but maintained that they were not readily identifiable (Prigatano &
Altman, 1990). Left untreated over time, deficits in unawareness result in a culmination
of financial difficulties, decreased self-esteem, and social isolation (Murphy, 2003).

Complications in achieving unified terminology

In addition to being a complicated phenomenon, at this time no straightforward
and unitary definition of this concept has been proposed (Cheng & Man, 2006; Flashman
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et ai., 2005). The language used to define the absence of awareness further complicates
an already intricate and complex explanation of the problem. Specifically, telminology
has been frequently interchanged in the scientific literature to communicate different
facets of this phenomenon (Flashman et ai. 2005). Research studies have reported such
terms interchangeably as anosognosia, agnosia, unawareness and denial (Flashman, 2002;
Flashman, et ai., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2004), lack of insight, and anosodiaphoria
(Flashman et aI, 2005). These terms have suggested various meanings, and seem to be
dependent upon the context of the study, or the interpretation by the authors (Flashman,
2002; Flashman, et ai., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2004).
Some studies have attempted to define and differentiate the terminology
operationally. Studies by Agnew & Morris (1998) suggested that the lack of insight or
awareness were used synonymously and reflected a change in metacognitive functioning.
Some research studies have distinguished between denial and anosognosia specifically
for motor impairment, and have reported different forms of unawareness, as well as
different underpinnings for the impairment (Dalla Barba et ai., 1999). Studies by
Anderson and Tranel (1989) found that the patient's unawareness of cognitive deficits did
not coincide with unawareness of motor impairments. It was reported that many patients
without motor deficits demonstrated a striking unawareness only of cognitive impairment
(Anderson & Tranel, 1989).
Prigatano (2005) defined the concept of impaired self-awareness and anosognosia
interchangeably as "the clinical phenomena in which a brain dysfunctional patient does
not appear to be aware of impaired neurological or neuropsychological function, which is
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obvious to the clinician and other reasonably attentive individuals" (Prigatano, 2005, p.
20).
Other research has attempted to define how unawareness is viewed as a symptom,
and separately from a biological perspective. Research by Orfei and colleagues (2007)
defined the concept of anosognosia as being more closely related to neurological brain
lesions. In their research on stroke patients, the authors have narrowed the fields to such
key areas of stroke, anosognosia, awareness, denial, unawareness, and hemiplegia, along
with corresponding neurological and neuropsychological data and clinical trial outcome.
The study indicated that the concept of unawareness and its multifaceted behavioral
manifestations yield a complex phenomenon that contributes to the uncertainty of
conceptual definitions and diagnoses (Orfei et al., 2007).
The term anosognosia, which literally translates as "lack of knowledge of disease"
(p. 309) was previously introduced by Babinski in 1914 (Agnew & Morris, 1998;
Markova & Berrios, 2000; Prigatano & Weinstein, 1996; Orfei et al., 2007; Vuilleumier,
2004). Babinski's studies reported on two patients with left hemiplegia following injury
to the non-dominant hemisphere (Dalla Barba, Bartolomeo, Ergis, Boisse & BachoudLevi, 199; Hart et al. 1998). Such examples include patients who have hemiplegia but
believe their paralyzed limbs still function normally (Clare, 2003); one was unaware of
her paralysis for several years (Prigatano & Weinstein, 1996).
In the late nineteenth century, studies by Anton found evidence that patients were
oblivious to major neurological impairments, seemingly unaware or denying the
disability despite evidence to the contrary (Markova & Berrios, 2000). These reports
specifically addressed unawareness of cortical blindness (Anton's syndrome) and
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deafness (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Markova & Berrios, 2000; Prigatano & Weinstein,
1996; Vuilleumier, 2000; Vuilleumier, 2004).
Flashman et aI. (2005) described Anton's Syndrome as one of the most
remarkable representations of impaired awareness. Patients who sustained damage to the
occipital cortex or optic radiations involving the primary visual or visual association
cortex suffered with cortical blindness as a result. The destruction of the ability to process
visually resulted in an unobstructed display of visual imagery, but was misinterpreted by
the patient as the inability to see. This may also have contributed to the patients'
confabulated responses often found documented in the literature (Flashman et aI., 2005).
Wernike described patients with aphasia who were unaware of their language
deficits (Agnew & Monis, 1998; Flashman et aI., 2005). More recent literature has
demonstrated the fact that anosognosia has been reported to accompany what has been
described as jargon aphasias, which includes Wernicke's aphasia, transcorticcal sensory
aphasia and global aphasia (Flashman et aI., 2005).
These aphasias, characterized by long, ongoing sentences, meaningless sounds,
phonemic or semantic paraphasias and neologisms, appeared to go unrealized by the
patient (Flashman et aI., 2005). Consistent with previous reports, studies by Clare (2002)
reported patients who demonstrated unawareness deficits for fluent aphasia produced
numerous paraphasias and neologisms.
Based upon observable behaviors, patients seemed completely oblivious to what
was being said to them, and were unaware that the listeners did not comprehend what the
patients were trying to express (Flashman et aI., 2005). Studies reported that although

PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 11

these patients believed that they were communicating effectively, they became frustrated
when they were not understood by the examiner (Clare, 2002).
In the late 1800' s, Korsakoff noted the lack of concern for amnesia (Agnew &
Morris, 1998). Westphal repOlied on a patient with hemianopia and hemiparesis who was
not aware of his deficits. Sudden hemianopia and hemiplegia are most commonly
associated with a vascular origin, often following a stroke, commonly occurring within
the nondominant hemisphere (Flashman et al., 2005). From a functional perspective,
despite the patients' inability to move or utilize the contralateral limbs (often the arm), or
acknowledge stimuli in the contralateral hemifield, the patients stated that they were
unimpaired (Flashman et aI., 2005).
More recent studies have repeatedly demonstrated the fact that stroke patients
diagnosed with anosognosia for hemiparesis denied the paresis, or acted as though the
disorder did not exist (Baier, 2004). Patients tended to behave as though the limbs
functioned normally, or they addressed the situation as though the limbs were simply
tired (Baier, 2004).
Studies by Carota and his colleagues (2002) reported that patients with
anosognosia for a hemiparesis did not spontaneously complain about their deficits. Other
patients acknowledged weakness in only one limb, although there was a complete-side
hemiplegia. Patient complaints were found to be either congruent, when they walked or
performed activities, or incongruent, when only hesitantly accepting a wheelchair or bed
(Carota et al., 2002).
In a study of patients who sustained a stroke, Hartman-Maeir, Soroker, Ring and
Katz (2002) reported that thirty percent of the entire sample did not spontaneously
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acknowledge having had a stroke following a general inquiry about the reasons for
hospitalization. When queried, a small percentage reportedly denied having had a stroke.

Not limited to traumatic brain injury

Much of the literature describing anosognosia has focused on patients who have
sustained moderate to severe injuries to the central nervous system (Flashman et al.,
2005); Sherer et al., 1993). Although research has focused predominantly on groups with
severe traumatic brain injury, little has been reported on other severity groups or in the
non-traumatic brain injured population (Leathem, Murphy, & Flett, 1998).
Studies by Sawchyn, Mateer and Suffield (2005) reported that in the majority of
the literature, patients have been sampled from inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation
programs or settings, which included predominantly those who had experienced moderate
to severe brain injury. Other studies have expanded the conceptual definition of
unawareness to include physical disabilities, traumatic events, abnormality in mood,
disruptions in social interactions (Prigatano & Weinstein, 1996), and neurological
disorders (Flashman et al., 2005).
Research has also demonstrated the fact that deficits in awareness affect cognitive
and behavioral domains more than they affect physical problems or functional activities,
such as the patient's activities of daily living (Hart et al., 2004). A study by Sherer and
his colleagues (1998b) found that some patients acknowledged deficits; however, many
failed to understand the likely impact of these deficits on their daily activities.

PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 13

Studies by Prigatao et al. (1990) found, that despite their lack of awareness for emotional
and cognitive deficits, patients accurately appraised the areas of physical activity and
basic self-care activities.
Research by Sherer and colleagues (2000) suggested that impaired awareness may
be related to the patient's overall cognitive and emotional functioning. Patients who were
unaware of changes following brain injury experienced significant depression (Sherer, et
al., 1998b). Gasquoine (1992) reported that emotional dysphoria (defined in the study as
anxiety, depression, and hostility) was significantly and positively correlated with the
patient's unawareness of sensory and cognitive changes following head injury. Positive
affect was significantly and negatively correlated with the patient's awareness of sensory
and cognitive changes.
Studies by Prigatano, Altman and O'Brien (1990) found that individuals with
traumatic brain injury had difficulty with emotional dyscontrol, cognitive ability, and
social interaction. More recent studies have repOlied that patients with deficits in
awareness exhibited poor self-appraisals in areas affecting their capacities for sound
judgment, cognitive ability, interpersonal skills and social behavior (Flashman et al.,
2005).
Findings suggested that neurological disorders including strokes, tumors, and
progressive dementi as also resulted in physical, cognitive and behavioral decline, postinsult (Sherer, et al., 1998c), and often rendered the patient unable to notice or
acknowledge the existence of their impairments (Vuilleumier, 2004). In SPECT Studies
by Venneri and Shanks (2003), findings identified marked hypoperfusion in the right
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parietotemporal cortex in a patient with persistent anosognosia for hemiplegia following
a stroke.
In a comprehensive review from 1990 through 2007, Orfei and her colleagues
reported that studies on impaired self-awareness have been focused primarily on stroke
hemiplegic patients. Studies by Bogod, Mateer and MacDonald (2003) found the
phenomenon of unawareness to be present in a number of behavioral syndromes
following brain injury.
In a study by Wagner, Spangenberg, Bachman and O'Connell (1997) the authors
found that the Alzheimer patient group demonstrated significantly greater unawareness of
cognitive deficits than did the two control groups. Their results concluded that
independent of dementia severity, unawareness of cognitive ability is disease-specific.
Studies by Clare on early-stage Alzheimer's patients (2002) found that although
some symptoms of unawareness could be accounted for by neurological damage,
apparent unawareness was viewed as the product of psychosocial processes and their
interactions with cognitive impairments.
Flashman (2002) reported that impaired awareness in Alzheimer patients ranged
from the patient's acknowledging impaired memory but minimizing its severity, to the
inaccurate report of very good memory skills. In a comprehensive study by Barrett,
Eslinger, Ballentine and Heilman (2005), the authors concluded that patients with
Alzheimer's disease estimated memory, attention, behavior, naming, visuospatial skill,
limb praxis, mood and uncorrected vision before and after their abilities were assessed.
Compared with controls, the patients with Alzheimer's disease demonstrated
unawareness of their deficits, including overestimating visuospatial skills during
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pretesting, and overestimating their memory abilities during the posttest (Barrett et a1.,
2005).
Studies by Selzer, Vaster line, Mathias and Brennen (2001) reported that patients
with Alzheimer's disease and patients with Parkinson's disease rated themselves as being
less compromised than did their caregivers. The two groups differed significantly on
awareness discrepancy measures from a cognitive perspective. In the ratings of patient
cognitive skills, caregivers rated Alzheimer's patients significantly more impaired than
the patients were able to recognize; however, caregivers and Parkinson's patients did not
significantly differ on these ratings. The authors concluded that both groups of patients
displayed impaired awareness on motor-related neurologic function. Parkinson's disease
patients displayed relatively preserved awareness of motor and other deficits. Impaired
awareness in patients with Parkinson's was associated with poorer overall cognitive
function and with performance on memory, attention, and constructional ability, than
were the Alzheimer's patients.
Studies found that patients who suffered from Parkinson's disease exhibited
poorer overall cognitive ability and lower performance on assessment measures of
memory, attention and constructional ability; this was reported to be inconsistent with the
patient's self-report of symptoms (Flashman, 2002).
Leritz and her colleagues (2004) investigated whether or not patients with
Parkinson's disease exhibited the features of anosognosia. Findings indicated that
patients rated themselves as significantly less impaired on two measures of activities of
daily living, indicating that disruption of the basil ganglia may alter patient insight into
the severity of illness (Leritz et a1., 2004).
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Studies by Goverover, Chiaravalloti and DeLuca (2005) reported a significant,
positive correlation between cognitive abilities and self- awareness in executive
dysfunction and disinhibition in patients with multiple sclerosis. However, affective
symptoms of depression, and anxiety were negatively correlated with self-awareness of
executive dysfunction.
Sherman, Rapport and Ryan (2008) investigated patients with Multiple Sclerosis
and evaluated subjective report of awareness deficits against objective test scores on
cognitive abilities. Findings concluded that one-third of patients exhibited diminished
awareness of cognitive and functional deficits. Their study suggested that unawareness of
deficits was more commonly found among patients with secondary progressive Multiple
Sclerosis than among those with relapse-remitting Multiple Sclerosis (Sherman et aI.,
2008).
Studies on awareness deficits on patients with Huntington's disease exhibited
denial of impairment, with unawareness of motor, cognitive and emotional changes
(Goverover et aI, 2005).
Deficits in awareness have also been identified in individuals with chronic
alcoholism, schizophrenia, affective disorders and stress, as well as in medical disorders
including breast cancer, heart disease and HIV and AIDS (Flashman, 2002). Studies by
McEvoy, Freter, Merritt, and Apperson (1993) examined the correlation between frontal
lobe and right hemispheric dysfunction and impaired awareness in patients with
schizophrenia; however, the attempt to correlate neurological and psychiatric models of
impaired awareness remains unclear (Markova & Berrios, 2000)
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Clinical Models of Explanation

At this time, no one study has been able to provide a comprehensive model of the
psychological processes that underlie the expression of unawareness of deficits (Clare,
2003) However, several models to explain impaired self-awareness have been proposed.
According to Cheng and Man (2006) most clinical models share three common
components. First, there is a description of the patient's lack of objective knowledge.
Second, it is difficult for patients to apply objective information or knowledge about their
own impairments to daily life. Third, neuropsychological abilities such as goal setting,
self-performance prediction, and self-monitoring of psychological factors influence
impaired self-awareness.
Studies by Giancino and Cicerone (1998) reported a model composed of three
sources of self-awareness. These included: 1) the limitation of cognitive impairment,
specifically related to deficits in memory and reasoning; 2) the limitation of the
psychological response or reaction to the impairment; and 3) the limitation of the
inability to recognize the area of impairment.
Crosson et al. (1989) proposed a three-tier model, identifying three distinct types
of self-awareness, including intellectual awareness (described as the ability of the patient
to comprehend that a particular function is impaired), emergent awareness (the ability of
the patient to recognize that there is a functional problem as it occurs), and anticipatory
awareness (the patient's ability to anticipate the problem that will occur as a result ofthe
deficit).
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Studies by Allen and Ruff (1990) created a comprehensive, three-level clinical
model of self-awareness. The first level required the patient to attend to, to be able to
encode information, and to retrieve information concerning the self. The second level
required the patient to be able to compare existing information with premorbid, selfevaluative information. The third level required the patient to be able to describe selfperception to another individual.
Fleming, Strong and Ashton (1996) proposed a comprehensive, three-level model
of awareness, comprising awareness of objective knowledge, of functional implications
and ways in which these impairments related to the patient's daily activities, and the
patient's ability to establish realistic goals.

In more recent studies by Toglia and Kirk (2000), the authors expanded upon
Crosson's hierarchal model. According to this later model, awareness was divided into
two major areas: metacognition, and what the authors described as online awareness
(Toglia & Kirk, 2000). The authors described metacognitive knowledge as declarative
knowledge concerning one's abilities. Online awareness was described as the ability to
demonstrate ongoing monitoring of an individual's actual performance during the task
(Dirette, 2002; Toglia & Kirk, 2000).

Underlying Neuronal Mechanisms

Currently, knowledge of the possible mechanisms underlying deficits in
unawareness is still very poor (Dalla Barba et aI., 1999). The neuronal pathways of
anosognosia are still debated (Orfei et aI., 2007), and few systematic studies have been
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accomplished because the focus of these more effectively characterizes the clinical
features of unawareness and its underlying cognitive mechanisms (Vuilleumier, 2004).
More recent studies have been descriptive in addressing various lesion types and severity
of neurological impairments, whereas studies focusing on experimental design have been
limited or accomplished in only a few single cases (Vuilleumier, 2000).
Earlier studies by McGlynn and Schacter (1989) concluded that anosognosia
resulted from concurrent lesions within several areas of the brain, thereby creating
varying degrees and combinations of producing different presentations of the disorder
(Agnew & Morris, 1998).
Research by Anderson and Tranel (1989) found that unawareness of hemiparesis
was found only in subjects with right-hemisphere damage, suggesting that knowledge
associated with right hemisphere neuronal networks (predominantly the primary and
early association cortices where sensory and motor processes occur) necessary for the
perception of an impaired function, was disrupted.
In the most recent comprehensive evaluation of hemispheric specialization,
findings concluded that the right cerebral hemisphere is dominant for the awareness both
of physical and of emotional self (Devinsky, 2008). Body image, relationship to the
environment, and social function are mediated by neuronal pathways associated with
right hemisphere involvement (Devinsky, 2008).
Consistent with research, studies found that patients who sustained lesions to the
right hemisphere resulted in left-sided neglect, and anosodiaphoria (emotional
indifference). In this case, motor problems were acknowledged, but without concern
(Ossola, Ladavas, Stracciari, Giannarelli & Ossola, 1993). In studies by Devinsky (2008),
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Lesions to the right hemisphere were also associated with topographical disorientation,
social disorders, and anosognosia.
Although deficits in unawareness have often been associated with neurological
disorder involving cOliical brain regions, relatively few studies have examined the role of
subcortical structures (Leritz, Loftis, Crucian, Friedman & Bowers, 2004). Because
subcortical structures (such as the thalamus, caudate nucleus and internal capsule) are
connected extensively to larger cortical regions including the frontal lobes, one can
expect that deficits in awareness would be similar to patients with cOliicallesions (Leritz
et aI., 2004).
The most recent neuropsychological models also suggested that problems with the
feed-forward system and neuro-anatomical research consistently report right cerebral
hemisphere (specifically, the prefrontal and parieto-temporal cortex, insula and thalamus)
involvement (Orfei et aI., 2007).
Studies by Andelman and colleagues (2004) found that patients with intractable
epilepsy experienced significant distortions in their awareness of memory. Findings
suggested that patients with epileptogenic right-hemisphere brain lesions overestimated
their memory abilities, but patients with left-hemisphere lesions more equally
overestimated and underestimated their abilities, similar to normal control subjects
(Andelman et aI., 2004).
Damage to the overarching control system mediated by the frontal lobes would
result in a generalized disturbance of awareness for cognitive disorders (Agnew &
Morris, 1998; Ossola et aI., 1993). This is consistent with earlier theories of anosognosia
which postulated that the disorder was due to impairment within the central monitoring
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systems, or to damage to the system governing conscious awareness (McGlynn &
Schacter, 1989).
Stuss, Picton, and Alexander (2002) proposed a theory of consciousness
encompassing four distinct theories, summarized as: 1) awareness occurs as a result of
cerebral processes that create models of the world; 2) the brain's ability to create these
models are arranged in a hierarchal fashion; 3) within anyone division of this hierarchy,
the processes operate in a modular fashion, and 4) At the highest level of conscious
processing, the frontal lobes are significant in the role of conscious processing.
Specifically, the right frontal lobe is critical for an individual to be self-aware (Stuss et aI,
2002).
In a study by Johnson et al. (2002) utilizing functional imaging, the authors
concluded that the medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate were identified as
important structures for accessing a sense of self, and were consistent with previous brain
lesion studies in patients diagnosed with impaired self-awareness.
McGlynn and Schacter (1989) reported that patients with amnesic disorders due
to frontal lobe impairment tended to be unaware of their memory deficits; this is in
comparison with patients whose amnesic disorders were due to temporal lobe damage.
Markova and Berrios (2000) reported that many studies investigating these
associations with frontal lobe involvement have not measured awareness in a systematic
way and that findings concluded either a presence of or an absence of the disorder.
Because many of these studies are single-case designs, from an empirical standpoint, it is
difficult to generalize the fmdings conceming the relationship between unawareness and
frontal lobe deficits (Markova & Berrios, 2000).
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Studies have demonstrated that damage to the parietal lobes would result in
impairment to the brain's center responsible for monitoring more peripheral difficulties,
such as motor and sensory impairment (Ossola et aL, 1993).
Studies by Andersson, Gundersent and Finset (1999) reported reduced se1fawareness to be associated with low autonomic reactivity. Their results concluded that
reduced psychophysiological reactivity in patients who present as apathetic were
associated with a decrease in emotional response, disengagement, and lack of concern for
their current situation (Andersson, et al., 1999).

Measuring Impaired Awareness

The concept of impaired self-awareness remains a complicated and intricate
phenomenon, and research on the nature and course of impairment following traumatic
brain injury is still at an early stage (Sherer, et al., 1998b). Disturbances of self-awareness
following neuropsychological insult are difficult to measure (Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998).
The need for the accurate assessment of impaired awareness plays a critical role
in contributing to patients' overall independent functioning (Bogod et al., 2003;
Prigatano, 1999; Sherer, et al., 1998a; Sherer, Madison & Hammay, 2000; Toglia & Kirk,
2000), the need for continued health care, the patient's ability to live independently, and
whether or not the patient will be able to return to work or to former activities (Sherer et
al., 2000). Correct identification also assists in the development of a treatment or
remediation plan to address the patient's need for supervision, medical care,
rehabilitation, and related costs (Sherer et al., 2000).
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Findings by Sherer and colleagues (1998b) suggested that impaired awareness
was not a global deficit, and was related not only to the severity of impairment, but also
related to the measure utilized to make the diagnosis. Not only was this due to the scope
of what was included within the concept of awareness (Toglia & Kirk, 2000), but also
may conceivably be the result ofthe variety of ways in which the construct of awareness
has been defined across studies (Sherer, et al., 1998b; Toglia & Kirk, 2000).
There is a shortage of specific instruments and interventions to improve deficits in
unawareness (Appelros, Karlsson, Seiger & Nydevik, 2002). Although a number of
strategies have been implemented to obtain a quantitative evaluation, there is no single
method to measure impaired awareness (Appelros et aL, 2002; Flashman & McAllister,
2002; Fleming, Strong & Ashton, 1996), and no gold standard for what it is that
constitutes this phenomenon (Bogod et aL, 2003).
The use of self-report questionnaires, one method of gathering quantitative
information, is scored by the interviewer, and compared with a rating scale (Flashman &
McAllister, 2002). In order to make inferences concerning impaired self-awareness, the
patient's report must differ from another external measure, such as performance on
neuropsychological assessment measures (Anderson & Tranel, 1989), The general
assumption is that patients who exhibit impairment in self awareness will rate their
abilities as better than the standard; the discrepancy between the self-perception of
abilities and actual scores is said to be the measure of the level of unawareness (Bali et
al., 2004; Sherer, et al., 1998b).
Self-report questionnaires are often used to gather both quantitative and
qualitative information about patients' self-perceptions of their abilities (Bali et al.,
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2004). Over the years, research has focused on the patient's self-report with the intent to
study its effect on rehabilitation outcome, and to assess the efficacy of treatment
modalities which focus on improving awareness (Sherer, et al., 1998a, 1998b).
The Patient-Competency Rating Scale (PCRS) is a measure that provides self-and
informant-ratings of every day memory and gives an overview of the patient's awareness
of their difficulties (Leathem, Murphy & Flett, 1998). In a study utilizing two measures
of awareness, (clinician rating versus PCRS), Fischer, Trexler and Gauggel (2004)
confirmed the fact that brain injured patients tended to overestimate their abilities when
these patients are compared with orthopedic controls. Borgaro and Prigatano (2003)
modified the rating scale for neurobehavioral rehabilitation (PCRS-NR) and found that
the psychometric properties of this briefer version of the rating scale were found to be
psychometrically sound for the use in an acute neurorehabilitation unit.
In a study by Leathem et al. (1998), the traumatic, brain injured patients overrated
their pre-accident competencies when they were compared with normal controls. Patients
with moderate and mild brain injuries were consistent in their reports on cognitive and
emotional domains.
The findings, in study by Duke and his colleagues (2002), concluded that
Alzheimer's patients tended to estimate their own memory abilities to be as good as that
of the controls, over predicting their self-performance. Additionally, patients inaccurately
underestimated their difficulties in carrying out daily functioning tasks, in comparison
with caregiver reports (Duke & Seltzer, 2002). Although Alzheimer's patients
demonstrated intact, immediate awareness of their memory difficulties, they failed to
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incorporate incidents of memory failure into a generalized self-belief system (Duke &
Seltzer, 2002).
In a study utilizing the Self-Awareness of Deficits Interview (SADI), Simmond
and Fleming (2003) investigated the reliability of the measure. Their results indicated
high inter-rater reliability for the SADI, and reported that the measure is a reliable means
of evaluating the level of self-awareness.
Few cross-cultural studies have been reported in the literature. In a cross-cultural
study comparing New Zealand Maoris and non-Maoris brain injured patients, Prigatano
and Leathem (1993) compared patients' scores, utilizing the PCRS. Their research
indicated that both groups showed no correlation between actual neuropsychological
status and their self-report of behavioral competency. In contrast, the ratings of their
relatives concerning their behavioral competency were correlated with the patients'
neuropsychological test performance.
The authors concluded that Maori patients reported less behavioral competency
than non-Maori patients; non-Maori patients' performances on the PCRS replicated
findings which were compared with American brain-injured patients. Their research
concluded that brain damage contributes to patients' misperceptions of their own
behavioral abilities; however, cultural factors also played a critical role (Prigatano &
Leathem, 1993).
Although questionnaires and structured interviews have been most frequently
utilized, some limitations concerning these instruments have been repOlied in the
literature. The use both of questiom1aires and of structured interviews relies heavily on
the patient's ability to understand oral and written questions verbally, and to convey their
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understanding of their deficits verbally (Flashman & McAllister, 2002). A study by
Appelros and his colleagues (2002) indicated that self-report instruments cannot be
effectively utilized when a patient's level of consciousness is reduced; this may have
added a degree of uncertainty to the findings of their study.
Comparisons of self-appraisal may be measured against that of a family
member's, a clinician's, or a rehabilitative staffs rating (Flashman & McAllister, 2002;
Sherer, et al., 1998a, 1998b; Toglia & Kirk, 2000), although it can invite caregiver and
relative biases that may influence the patient (Fleming et al., 1996; Hart et al., 2004).
However, when ratings are obtained by clinical and rehabilitative staff, the patient's
premorbid information prior to the brain injury may not be available to the raters, thereby
confounding a complete and accurate assessment (Flashman & McAllister, 2002).
Studies by Bair and Karnath (2005) investigated whether or not patients
mentioned their impairments spontaneously rather than when prompted. Their study
concluded that individuals who did not mention their paresis spontaneously, but
acknowledged the deficits when questioned directly, should not be diagnosed as having
anosognosia. In a case study by Berti et at. (1998), the authors found that the patient
demonstrated severe agnosia for motor impairment when reporting symptoms; however,
only implicit knowledge of her condition was demonstrated. A contrast was noted
between being unaware on a verbal report when compared with awareness on selfevaluation tests (Berti et al., 1998).
The most common way to measure a patient's awareness level is through
comparison of the individual's self-appraisal against the individual's scores on another
standardized or objective measure (Flashrnan & McAllister, 2002; Fleming et al., 1996)
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such as the use of a self-report measure in comparison with a patient's performance on
neuropsychological tests, or other performance measures (Flashman & McAllister, 2002;
Toglia & Kirk, 2000).

The challenge for rehabilitation

Rehabilitation professionals agree that deficits in awareness continue to present
major challenges so that a successful treatment outcome may be achieved (Flashman et
aI., 2005; Sherer et aI., 2000; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). The role of physical rehabilitation
has been the predominant form of rehabilitation following brain injury, and it has been
only in the past two decades that psychologists, rehabilitation specialists, and
neuropsychologists refocused their efforts on psychosocial and cognitive rehabilitation
(Cheng & Man, 20(6).
Within the domain of cognitive rehabilitation, research efforts have
predominantly concentrated on the rehabilitation of cognitive abilities including memory,
attention, orientation, comprehension, problem-solving and perception deficits. Other
studies have found that rehabilitative programs were typically designed and implemented
based on physical and neuropsychological assessment; however, they often neglected an
assessment of the patient's motivational state (Andersson et aI., 1999).
Although there are some research studies that have reported on the benefits of
improving the patient's self-awareness, there is presently no consensus on models to
guide intervention, or identification about which interventions are the most effective
(Lucas & Fleming, 2005). It is imperative for brain injury rehabilitation specialists to
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comprehend this phenomenon and to implement appropriate treatment approaches which
may conceivably improve patient self-awareness (Sherer et al., 1998c). Establishing the
framework for self-awareness in rehabilitation has been developed gradually, but it
remains in its infancy (Cheng & Man, 2006).
Additionally, because many patients who sustain brain injury are partially or fully
unaware of this impairment, the treatment and rehabilitation is often hindered by this very
deficit (Anderson & Tranel 1989). Although patients who demonstrated deficits in
awareness exhibited a sense of self-regard of their own abilities and traits, they were not
congruent with what others observed (Stuss, 1991). Sherer and his colleagues (l998b)
found that although patients acknowledged deficits, many failed to understand the likely
impact of these deficits on their daily activities.
Studies have found that not only does the conect identification of deficits in
awareness have important implications for rehabilitative outcome (Bogod et. al., 2003;
Flashman, 2002; Sherer et al., 1998b; Toglia & Kirk, 2000), the ability to identify these
impairments accurately is implicated in diagnostic treatment, and independent
functioning (Flashman, 2002; Sherer, Bergloff, Boake, High & Levin, 1998b; Orfei et al.,
2007; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Studies by Prigatano (2005) found that impaired selfawareness was related to treatment outcome, length of stay, treatment compliance, and
the establishment of a working alliance in therapy (Anderson et al. 1999; Prigatano
2005).
The successful assessment and management of traumatically brain injured adults
requires that the patients have insight into their own functional limitations, including how
awareness deficits impact their activities of daily living (Prigatano, Alman & O'Brien,
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1990). At the basic level, implementing compensatory strategies requires the patient
initially to be aware that a problem needs to be addressed, and participation in
remediation involves the recognition that these problem areas need to be strengthened or
improved (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Self-awareness requires that the patient compare
information from an external, objective source, with the patient's own inner experience
(O'Callaghan, Powell & Oyebode, 2006).
Studies reported that the inability of the patient to recognize deficit areas that
need improvement prevented the participation in even the most remedial activities
(Toglia & Kirk, 2000), and often resulted in the patient's refusal, or even total resistance
to treatment efforts (Hart et aI., 2004). Studies have found that patients were less likely to
implement compensatory strategies when the need for these strategies was not apparent
(Sherer et aI., 1998a; Toglia & Kirk, 2000).
Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that deficits in awareness negatively
impacted rehabilitation efforts because they significantly disrupted the patient's
participation in rehabilitation, impeded motivation for treatment (Hart et aI., 2004; Sherer
et aI., 1998a; Sherer et aI., 1998c; Toglia & Kirk, 2000), decreased involvement in
therapy tasks, and reduced compliance of behavioral change suggestions (Fleming,
Strong & Ashton, 1998).
With unawareness comes the lack of motivation, a common sequelae following
brain injury. Many patients lack the motivation to comply with rehabilitative treatment
protocols (Sherer, et aI., 1998a; Anderson et aI., 1999; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Studies by
Andersson and his colleagues (1999) reported that a major problem both in physical and
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in neuropsychological rehabilitation following brain injury was the ability to engage
patients in rehabilitation activities.
In a study by Andersson et al. (1999), the authors investigated the relationship
between patient apathy and emotional reactivity, measured by the change in
electrodermal and cardiovascular activity during therapeutic involvement. Their findings
concluded that reducing apathy and increasing self-awareness would promote patient
motivation both in rehabilitation, and within the therapeutic relationship. Anderson et al.
(1999) reported that ignoring such emotions as patient apathy could easily create
unrealistic expectations both in the patients and in the rehabilitation staff.
The incompatibility between a patient's unrealistic goals, family expectations, and
goals posed by the treatment team presents additional challenges to rehabilitation
professionals (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Awareness and self-monitoring require the ability to
evaluate the level of difficulty involved in a task as it relates to the person's individuals
strengths and weaknesses, as well as an ability to plan ahead and to incorporate
appropriate strategies (Goverover, 2004).
Studies have found that there was a tendency for patients to choose activities
beyond their perceived abilities, with little recognition of deficit, or the recognition that
they required any assistance at all (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Sherer et al. (1998b) repOlied
that the functional outcome of treatment objectives was impeded by the patient's inability
to choose appropriate long-term goals accurately. As a result of incompatible goals,
patients often experienced repeated failures over time, increasing their levels of
frustration (Prigatano, 2005).
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In a study by Fischer, Gauggel and Trexler (2004), the authors examined the
relationship between awareness, the ability to set realistic goals, and outcome for
rehabilitation. Their findings demonstrated the fact that patients with less realistic
awareness of their limitations set less realistic goals. Hence, rehabilitative outcome was
found to be lower for these patients when compared with patients who demonstrated
more realistic views of their impairments. Their studies concluded that self-awareness
was related to higher goal setting ability and positive outcome in long-term rehabilitation;
however, it was found to be less so for short-term experimental tasks.
Studies by Goverover (2004) examined the relationship between the patient's
executive function, self-awareness and every-day functional competence in patients who
sustained brain injury. The study indicated that categorization, deductive reasoning
(defined as an ability to formulate a hypothesis, make inferences and rationalize a
conclusion), and self-awareness were good predictors of functional performance of
activities of daily living, and could direct more appropriate planning of treatment
interventions.
Studies by Katz, Fleming, Keren, Lightbody and Haliman-Maeir (2002) repOlied
that deficits in awareness should be viewed on a continuum which will differ between
and within patients. Because patients exhibit varying degrees of this syndrome complete
with psychological and neurological factors, occupational therapists need to evaluate the
extent to which unawareness is present. Furthermore, the authors asserted that the
severity of awareness impairment should guide the treatment team in selecting between
structured awareness training versus compensatory strategies (Katz et al., 2002).
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In a comprehensive literature review by Lucas and Fleming (2005), the authors
outlined models to guide therapists' interventions and created key factors to consider
while implementing these tasks. Factors included the client-therapist relationship, goal
setting, task selection, and emotional issues. From an educative point of view, the authors
reviewed feedback techniques, behavioral therapy techniques, individual and group
psychotherapy, strength-and-weakness lists, and task-rating strategies. A multi-contextual
treatment approach, as well as an occupation-based intervention program was reviewed
(Lucas & Fleming, 2005).
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The concept of perceived control

The ability to comprehend the perception and attribution of control has long been
a major goal in the field of psychology (Declerck, Boone & De Brabander, 2006).
To date, the majority of studies addressing the phenomenon of control have provided no
conceptual definition of control; rather, the meaning is left to the reader's understanding,
or is given an operational definition to communicate meaning (Thompson, 1981).
According to Thompson (1981), control is defined as "the belief that one has at
one's disposal a response that can influence the aversiveness of an event" (p. 89). She
further asserts that although the definition is broad enough to address different types of
control, it also emphasizes the idea that "the control does not need to be exercised for it to
be effective and that it does not even need to be real, just perceived for it to have effects"
(p.89).
Of the literature addressing control, the largest body of research focuses on
analyzing individual differences in perceived control (Wegner & Bargh, 1998).
Psychological disorders ranging from depression or learned helplessness, to addiction and
psychosis are invariably accompanied by a sense of loss of control (Declerck et al.,
2006).
Schroder et ai., (2007) examined the perception of behavioral control in patients
with chronic idiopathic axonal polyneuropoathy. Their findings concluded that perceived
behavioral control, in part, mediated the impairment (identified as muscle strength) and
the patient's activity limitations. They found that the patient's impairment affected the
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individual's perceived control, and in turn, these perceptions contributed to the patient's
activity limitations.
Hasson-Ohayon, Walsh, Roe, Kravetz and Weiser (2006) differentiated between
perceived personal control (defined as control of self) and perceived interpersonal control
(defined as control of others) on different domains of quality of life for patients with
severe mental illnesses. Their results demonstrated the fact that personal control was
more positively related to the achievement of personal subjective goals, than to the
achievement of environmental and o~jective goals (Hasson-Ohayon et al. 2006).
A sense of cognitive control has been found to have overall positive effects on the
experience of an unpleasant event; knowing one has a cognitive strategy reduces
anticipatory anxiety, reduces the impact of the presenting issue, and improves the
subsequent effects (Thompson, 1981). Patients who feel a sense of control in the health
care environment demonstrated more positive adaptive outcomes, and tended to exhibit
more favorable emotional and behavioral responses to disease and aversive procedures
(Tangsrud & Smith, 2000). The authors suggested that high control perception
contributed to physical well-being through (a) avoidance of negative physiological results
associated with control loss and (b) the increased likelihood that that patients will
participate in appropriate health and maintenance behaviors (Tangsrud & Smith, 2000).
Studies by Fuhrer, Rintala, Hart, Clearman and Young (1992) found that
perceived control has the strongest association with life satisfaction. The authors asserted
that, theoretically, the concept of perceived control may be important as a psychological
variable that mediates the relationship between life satisfaction on the one hand and
handicap on the other. Chase, Comille and English (2000) examined the extent to which
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life satisfaction in patients with spinal cord injuries was linked to perceived control.
Exploratory findings suggested that the variables of perceived control (along with marital
status) were significant predictors of life satisfaction (English, 2000).
In a longitudinal study, Windsor, Anstey, Butterworth, and Rogers (2008)
investigated the relationship between negative life events in midlife and perceived
control. The study highlighted the importance of approach-avoidance traits both in
influencing control beliefs and in controlling the effects of stressful events on control.
Their results indicated that the experience of negative life events was associated with
weaker control beliefs. Additionally, a behavioral approach was positively reJated to
control which was found to be protective against negative life events that undermine
control beliefs.
Vallerand, Templin, Hasenau, & Riley-Doucet (2007) reported that a patient's
perceived control over pain was a subjective phenomenon that played an important part
in how an individual reacted to pain. Their findings concluded that the patients'
knowledge and attitudes about pain and symptom management affected their
participation in and acceptance of a particular pain management program, as well as their
adherence to therapy regimes (Vallerand et aI., 2007).
Other studies by Haythornthwaite, Menefee, Heinberg and Clark (2000) found
that patients' perceptions on control over pain, in addition to utilizing specific pain
coping strategies, were positively correlated with a positive outcome in chronic pain
conditions and in better adjustment. In a study by Vallerand et aI., (2007) it was found
that perception of control over pain had a significant effect on pain-related distress.
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Williams, Golding, Phillips and Towell (2004) investigated the effects of
differences in a pre-procedure briefing related to perceived control, and preparatory
information on the perceptions ofthe second of two identical pain situations. Their results
concluded that differences between participant groups were related to individual locus of
control, and that perceived control should be engendered in clinical situations in which
painful procedures were involved (Williams et. aI., 2004).
Studies by Jones, Mandy, and Partridge (2000) examined the effect of
empowering stroke patients, and found that the extent to which patients perceived they
were in control oftheir own recoveries encouraged them to contribute to their
rehabilitation. Bollini, Walker, Hamann, & Kestler (2004) concluded that interventions to
enhance perceptions of control and personal control expectancies served to protect
individuals from exposure to stressful situations.
In a study by White, Brown, Somers, and Barlow (2006) the authors examined the
relationships among anxiety sensitivity, perceived control, and agoraphobia. Their
findings indicated that anxiety sensitivity and perceptions of control (both threat and
emotional control) were correlated with agoraphobia. Those individuals who perceived
themselves to have little control over threatening situations and emotions, and who were
fearful of the physical symptoms associated with anxiety, exhibited more phobic
avoidance (White et aI., 2006).
Moser et al. (2007) examined the relationship between anxiety and perceived
control with in-hospital patients who had experienced an acute myocardial infarction.
Findings suggested that perceived control had a moderating relationship; when they
perceived that control was high, the association between anxiety and in-hospital
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complications was weak. When they perceived that control was low, the association
between anxiety and in-hospital complications was strong (Moser et al., 2007).
In a study by Velissaris, Wilson, Saling, Newton, and Berkovic (2007), findings
concluded that patients who experienced a fIrst-time seizure experienced threats to their
sense of control, which, in tum, resulted in changes to their cognitive and behavioral
processes. These included feelings of a pervasive loss both of physical and of
psychological control as a result of exposure to vulnerability. Findings concluded that at
one month, pervasive loss of control, as well as depression and anxiety, were associated
with subsequent seizures (Velissaris et aI., 2007).
The study also found that gender was most strongly related to perceived loss of
control, and suggested that women were more vulnerable to stress following a traumatic
event (Velissaris et aL, 2007). Additionally, the authors noted that those patients with a
previously diagnosed psychiatric history reported a pervasive loss of control, which
suggested that patient responses were influenced by susceptibility to stress. Pervasive loss
of control was reported more often by older patients (Velissaris et aI., 2007).
Studies by O'Donnell, De Soto, & De Soto (1993) suggested that those patients'
tendencies to over report symptoms on the NIS may have been more reflective of an
affective disturbance, or have been associated more closely with nonorganic impairment.
Although the underreporting of symptoms on the NIS may be the result of such
psychological and motivational factors (such as a desire to leave treatment, or the
reluctance to admit deficits), the tendency to underreport was associated with the more
significant, neurologically based anosognosia (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991).
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Impaired awareness and the perception of control

The question remains about whether or not an individual's awareness, impaired or
not, affects his or her appraisal of how he or she is able to perceive control over the
environment following brain injury. Restated differently, is there a relationship between
an individual's ability to acknowledge neurological deficits and the ability to perceive
control over one's behavior and his or her environment? Prigatano and Schater (1991)
define the concept of self-awareness as the ability to "perceive a situation, object or
interaction in a manner similar to others' perceptions, while at the same time maintaining
a sense of a private, subjective, or unique interpretation of the experience." (p. 12).
Few research studies have examined the interrelationship between impaired selfawareness the perception of control. From a conceptual standpoint, it is easy to view
impaired self-awareness simply as the consequence of cognitive dysfunction that
interrupts processes of perception, memory, and a comprehension ofthe changes in
oneself (Hart, 2005). Prigatano (1998) reported that for patients who sustained moderate
to severe traumatic brain injury, cognitive dysfunction emerged with an overall
disturbance of consciousness and day-to-day recall that manifested in obscuring the
patient's self-perception and perception of external reality.
Johnson et al. (2002) discussed the importance of a patient's ability to reflect
consciously on one's sense of self as a significant feature of self-awareness and defines a
sense of self as "a collection of schemata regarding one's abilities, traits and attitudes,
that guides our behaviors, choices and social interactions; the accuracy of one's sense of
selfwill impact ability to function effectively in the world." (p. 1808).
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Therefore the question remains, if the sense of self is impaired, rendering the
patient unaware, can the patient accurately perceive control over the abovementioned
abilities? The importance of determining whether or not the patient exhibits a deficit in
awareness would reflect impairment in the ability to perceive accurately his or her ability
to guide behavior, choices, and social interactions.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Participant Data Files

Individuals who were identified for this pilot study were selected from existing
archival patient data files located within a private psychological practice in
Mechanicsburg, Peillisylvania. The patients were originally recruited by way of selfreferral, through family members, physical therapists, physiatrists, psychiatrists,
neurologists, primary care physicians, schools, and attorneys. Each archival data file
represented an individual patient who participated in an assessment battery with the
intention of evaluating his or her current status of neurocognitive functioning.

Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

For purposes ofthis study, each data file consisted of demographic information
obtained from the patient's clinical interview, as well as a compilation of his or her
neuropsychological assessment measures and resultant diagnosis. Only patient charts that
met the criteria for a completed neuropsychological data set were selected. The
completed data set included two self-report independent checklists; selected
neuropsychological measures addressing specific cognitive domains were identified.
Those patients who did not complete both checklists, who completed only one, or who
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did not complete the neuropsychological assessment measures identified for this study
were excluded from selection.

Measures

Comprehensive Neuropsychological Assessment Battery

Patients who met criteria for the completion of assessment measures outlined for
this study were previously administered a neuropsychological battery addressing the
cognitive domains of intellect, verbal and visual memory, attention and concentration,
visuo-spatial ability, language, and executive functioning. In addition, self-report
checklists addressing personality and emotional functioning were also administered.
These inventories were selected, based upon the patient's presenting complaint or the
refenal question. All patients were administered the Perceived Control Across Domains
Scale (PCADS; Davis, Freeman & Royer, 2004) and the Neuropsychological Impairment
Scale (l\l"IS; O'Donnell, DeSoto, DeSoto & McQ Reynolds, 1993) as a measure of their
subjective report of symptoms.

Perceived Control Across Domains Scale (PCADS)

The Perceived Control Across Domains Scale (PCADS; Davis, Freeman & Royer,
2004) was developed as an untimed, 36-item self-report scale, intended to measure the
amount of the patient's perceived control across 17 common areas. Such domains include
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food intake, family relationships, work and school relationships, social and close
relationships, emotional expression, substance use, self care and health maintenance,
activities of daily living, aggressive behavior, self-injurious behavior, finances, thought
processes, compulsive and obsessive behaviors, mood state, future, goals, personal
influence over his or her environment, and the perceived control of physical discomfort
(Davis, Freeman & Royer, 2004).
The PCADS is administered as an untimed, self-report assessment measure,
taking approximately 15 minutes to complete. This measure, written at a seventh grade
reading level, is composed of six factors encompassing 17 items. The total scoring ranges
from zero to a total of 51. A cut-off score of 14 for the average college student would
indicate that the individual is within the average range within the population for college
students. In addition to an individual score, examination of individual item responses
allows the clinician to identify specific areas in which the individual may feel either
adequate or feel a loss of control across both cognitive and behavioral domains (Davis,
Freeman & Royer, 2004).

Psychometric Properties of the PCADS

Test-retest reliability. Statistical analysis demonstrated the fact that items were
reliable over time. The PCADS was administered in conjunction with the SOC-3 during
its initial administration. During the test-retest which occurred one week later, the
participants were administered only the PCADS. Test-retest reliability utilizing
Spearman's rho correlation coefficient between total PCADS scores and the total PCADS
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retest score was 1'=.898, p<'OOO, indicating strong test-retest validity. Correlations
between individual items and the corresponding retest scores were found to be
statistically significant for all items, with a range from .471 to 1.0 (p<.01).
Face Validity. The items are designed to be face-valid, with each domain clearly

identified (Le., "Goals"). Under each item the individual is able to choose which one of
four levels, ranging from zero (almost never having problems within this area) to three
(almost always having problems within this area) applies to him or her (Davis, Freeman
& Royer, 2004).

Neuropsychological Impairment Scale (NIS)

The NIS, a self-report, paper-and-pencil inventory consisting of 50 items, is
intended to screen and measure the patient's neuropsychological symptoms (NIS;
O'Donnell, DeSoto & DeSoto, 1993). There is a long version and short version of the
NIS, each designed to rate the patient's subjective complaints on a five-point scale. These
range from zero (not at all) to four (extremely). For purposes ofthis study, the shorter,
research edition of the N1S was administered as a screening measure of the patient's
neuropsychological complaints and as a supplement to the clinical interview.
The NIS is administered to adults ages 18 and older, and can be read at a fifthgrade reading level or above. Its purpose is to be utilized as an addition to the clinical
intake, or to supplement a comprehensive psychological or neuropsychological
assessment battery (O'Donnell et al., 1994). Development and the standardization of the
NIS is based upon the earlier research and deVelopment of the Cognitive Deficit Scale of
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the Symptom Checklist 90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1977) which led to the initial
and subsequent versions of the NIS (Leark, 1994). The most recent version of the NIS
was developed, based upon a group of patients who were cognitively impaired, postacute, and participating in cognitive rehabilitation. The nonclinical standardization
sample (N = 1,000) obtained was grouped demographically according to race, gender and
age, based upon the 1995 US Bureau of Census (Leark, 1994).

Psychometric Properties o/the NIS

Reliability. Split half, internal consistency Cronbach alpha coefficients and testretest reliability were used to assess reliability. For the neuropsychiatric sample, a
coefficient of .93 was found when correcting for attenuation (Leark, 1994). For
nonclinical samples, Cronbach alpha internal consistency coefficient values for each
scale range from .66 to .95. For the clinical sample, the values range from .67 to .97.
Median values for the scales are .79 for the nonclinical group and .86 for the clinical
group (Leark, 1994).

Test-retest reliability. Test-retest reliability was achieved by utilizing four
different subject groups: Group 1 (college-age subjects) with an average correlation of
.90 (ranging from .64 to .98); Group 2 (neuropsychiatric outpatients) yielded an average
coefficient of .91 (ranging from .78 to .94); Group 3 (neurological patients) from which
reliability coefficients were not reported, and Group 4 (outpatient rehabilitation
participants) which averaged .83 (ranging from .72 to .88). The patients were
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administered the NIS on two separate occasions, with a time interval of approximately
two weeks between each administration.

Construct validity. Construct validity assessed the scale correlations and factor
structure of the NIS, and was examined with respect to its intemal structure, as well as its
convergence with measures asserted to measure constructs of similar areas. The factor
structure compares both clinical and nonclinical standardization samples, with
relationship pattems found to be similar for both groups (Leark, 1994).

Criterion validity. Criterion validity was measured by looking at convergent
measures, screening ability and discriminant analysis. Findings concluded that the NIS is
sensitive to cognitive impairments. The NIS's screening effectiveness, encompassing hit
rate, sensitivity and specificity compared the GMI (Global Measure of Impairment)
scores (2:70) with Halstead Reitan Battery Impairment Indexes (2: .5). Given this criteria,
a .80 hit rate, a sensitivity of .91 and a specificity of .76 was achieved. The classification
table outlining the discriminant analysis yielded an overall 90% accurate classification
(Leark, 1994).

Cognitive Measures

In addition to the two measures of subjective self-report, a comprehensive
neuropsychological assessment battery had been administered in order to address the
following domains of neurocognitive functioning.
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Measures of Intellect

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997).
The WAIS-III provides Verbal (subtests include Information, Vocabulary, Similarities,
Comprehension, Arithmetic and Digit Span), Performance (subtests include Picture
Completion, Block Design, Matrix Reasoning, Picture Arrangement, Digit Symbol and
Object Assembly) and Full Scale IQ measures. Factor Scores include Verbal
Comprehension, Perceptual Organization, Working Memory and Processing Speed.

Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). The WASI
is designed as a reliable, brief measure of general cognitive ability (Hebben & Milberg,
2002). The WASI provides a Verbal IQ score (subtests of Vocabulary and Similarities), a
Performance IQ score (Block Design and Matrix Reasoning) and a Full Scale IQ score.
Because both intelligence measures were selected and administered, depending
upon referral question and presenting symptoms, only the Verbal, Performance and Full
Scale IQ scores will be utilized as a measure of intellectual ability.

Measures ofAttention

Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT; Smith, 1991). The SDMT is a task
requiring visual scanning and tracking under time demands (90 seconds). The examinee
is required to match specific numbers to specific geometric figures, utilizing a reference
key as a guide (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). The measure is administered in written and
oral format, and has a cut-off time demand of90 seconds.
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Digit Span (DS; Wechsler, 1987; Wechsler, 1997). The Digit Span subtest is a
task of short-term auditory sequential memory. The Digit Span subtest is one of the
subtests both of the WAIS-III and of the WMS-R. Numbers are read aloud to the
examinee who is required to repeat the sequence of digits back to the examiner in the
order presented. The amount of repeated numbers increases as the task progresses. The
task is also administered in a reverse format, during which the examinee is required to
recite numbers of progressively increasing length in a backwards format when presented
in a forward order by the examiner. Forward digit span is a measure of elementary
attention or span of apprehension; backward digit span is the ability to manipulate
information mentally, and requires the additional component of working memory
(Hebben & Milberg, 2002).

Trail Making Tests (TMT; Reitan & Wolfson, 1993). Trails A and B are a
measure of sustained visual attention, visual scanning, sequencing and cognitive
flexibility (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). The first task, Trails A requires the examinee to
scan a page and to connect the numbers in numerical sequence accurately, under a time
demand. The second task, Trails B, requires the examinee to differentiate between two
types of symbols (both numbers and letters), and to alternate from one set of symbols to
the other consistently (maintaining attention on two aspects of stimulus situation). This
task is also a measure of executive ability.
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Measures of Executive Function

Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, et aI., 1981). The WCST is a

measure of the examinee's ability to demonstrate concept formation and abstract
reasoning involving flexible problem-solving, the capacity to learn from experience, and
perseverative responding.
Category Test (CT; Reitan & Woflson, 1993). For purposes ofthis study the

booklet version of the Category Test was administered by the examiner. The task
measures complex concept formation encompassing the ability to note reoccurring
similarities and differences in stimulus material, postulate reasonable hypotheses about
the similarities and differences, test hypotheses by receiving positive or negative
feedback, and to adapt hypotheses based upon the reinforcement following each
response. This is also a measure of abstraction, reasoning and logical analysis essential
for organized planning. For purposes of this study, individuals were administered either
the WCST, CT or both, depending upon referral questions and levels of education.

Measures of Verbal Memory Function

Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (WMS-R; Wechsler, 1987). Both verbal and

visual memory tasks were administered. As a measure of verbal memory, the subtest of
Logical Memory I requires the examinee to listen and encode paragraph-length
information which consists of a few short sentences read aloud, and then to recall the
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story to the examiner immediately after it is read. A second story of different content is
also read aloud, and the examinee again, is required to encode and recall the infOlmation
presented orally. Logical Memory II is a measure of verbal retention; the examinee is
required to recall both passages after a 30-minute delay. This task yields a score for
verbal encoding, recall and retention.
Hopkins Verbal Learning Test-Revised (HVLT-R; Brandt & Benedict, 1991).
The HVLT-R is a word-list learning and memory task which consists of a list of 12
nouns, with four items taken from each of three semantic categories (Brand & Benedict,
1991). The task yields a score oftotal number of words encoded over three trials. A 2025 minute delay yields a recall and recognition score.

Measures of Visual Mem01Y Function

Wechsler Mem01Y Scale-Revised (WMS-R; Wechsler, 1987). As a measure of
visual memory, the subtest of Visual Reproduction I requires the examinee to examine
and encode four stimulus cards presented one at a time for a brief la-second exposure.
The examinee is then required to reproduce each card following exposure of the card.
Visual Reproduction II is a measure of visual retention; the examinee is required to
reproduce the four cards from memory after a 30-minute delay. This task yields a score
for visual encoding, recall and retention.
Rey Complex Figure Test and Recognition Trial (RCFT; Meyers & Meyers,
1995). The RCFT incorporates four trials consisting of a Copy trial, immediate recall
(administered at a three minute delay) of the figure, a delayed recall (administered after
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30 minutes) and a recognition trial administered directly after the 30-minute delay. The
task measures visuospatial recall and recognition memory, processing speed and visuoconstructional skill (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). The components of the three-minute
delay, 30-minute delay, and recognition trial were used as a measure of visual memory.

Measures of Language Function

Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT; Benton & Hamsher, 1989).
The COWAT is a task that measures the examinee's ability to produce individual words
which belongs to a particular class identified by a letter (Hebben & Milberg, 2002). The
task requires the individual to generate as many words as possible within a one-minute
interval. Two forms are used; one utilizes the letters ofF, A, and S; the second form
utilizes the letters C, P, and L. As a measure of categorical and semantic fluency, the
examinee is required to generate as many words as possible that belong to a particular
category under a one-minute time demand. For this data, the category of Animals was
utilized. The COWA T is also a measure of executive ability.

Measures ofSpatial and Constructional Skills

Judgment of Line Orientation (JOLO; Benton, et al., 1994). The JOLO is a
measure of spatial perception, orientation and visual-spatial judgment. The examinee is
required to identify and match angled lines to a stimulus card which details a multinumber radii arranged in a semicircle (Hebben & Milberg, 2002).
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Rey Complex Figure Test and Recognition Trial (RCFT; Meyers & Meyers,
1995). The copy trial was utilized as a measure of complex visuospatial and
constructional skills. The delay components of the RCFT included a three-minute delay, a
30-minute delay, and a recognition trial; these were used as a measure of visual memOlY
for the study.

Measures of Emotional and Personality Functioning

Because the presenting concerns and referral question dictated the measure of emotional
functioning to be utilized, the following self-report checklists were administered to
exammees:

Beck Depression Inventmy--II (BDI; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). The BDI is a
face-valid, self-report inventory consisting of21 statements which identify common
symptoms of depression and severity of symptoms (Hebben & Milberg, 2002).

Beck Anxiety Inventmy (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993). The BAI is a face-valid, selfreport inventory consisting of21 statements which identify common symptoms of
anxiety and their level of severity (Hebben & Milberg, 2002).

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventmy-2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom,
Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989). The MMPI-2 is a broad-range personality
inventOlY comprising 567 true-false statements. The measure is intended to screen for
psychopathology and assess the major symptoms of social and personal maladaptive
behaviors in individuals age 18 and older (Hebben & Milberg, 2002).
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Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory--III (MCMI-III , second edition; Million,
Davis & Million, 1997). The MCMI-III is a broad-range 175 item inventory assessing
personality and Axis I disorders, in individuals 18 and older. The test is designed to
assess the patient's long-term personality characteristics and his or her interaction with
the patient's presenting clinical symptoms (Millon, Davis & Millon, 1997).
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Procedures

Data collection

Data utilized for this study was collected from identified archival patient files that
had been assessed at a private practice during a period of four years. Each data file met
the criteria for the complete neuropsychological assessment battery identified for this
study. A letter of permission from the Clinical Director allowed the researcher access to
patient files, including demographic information and a summary of the completed
assessment data. For purposes of inter-rater reliability, the facility's Clinical Director
reviewed each patient's chart to ensure that each individual met the criteria for the
complete data set identified for the research study.
A summary sheet located in each archived patient file outlined raw scores, Tscores and percentile ranks for each neuropsychological measure and checklist, and was
photocopied by a staff assistant who worked within the facility. For ease of comparison,
only T -scores were entered for statistical analyses. All data was entered by the
researcher.
All identifiable information such as the patient's name, date of birth, referral
source, and occupation were blacked out from the photocopied page for each file.
Unidentifiable demographic information including presenting complaint, age,
education, gender, and diagnosis was entered into a statistical program for data analysis.
Each summary sheet was assigned a subject number before data was entered to ensure
confidentiality.
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For those patient files which had two sets of assessment scores (test-retest), only
the initial set of data from the first assessment was utilized for this study. All archival
patient charts were returned to their original file cabinet after use. All charts were
secured in order to ensure confidentiality of all patient data and assessment materials.

The assessment process for archival data Jiles

For each archived data file, a clinical interview had been previously conducted by
a licensed psychologist, who determined the assessment measures that would be
appropriate to address the patient's presenting complaints and referral questions.
Following the clinical interview, a doctoral-level psychology intern administered the
neuropsychological assessment battery as outlined by the supervising psychologist.
At the onset of the test administration, patients routinely and independently filled
out two standardized self-report measures. These allowed them to identify and evaluate
the severity of neuropsychological symptoms, as well as to self-appraise their
perceptions of overall functioning across several domains of daily living.
Following the completion of these checklists, a comprehensive
neuropsychological assessment was administered to appraise cognitive domains. These
included an evaluation of intellect, attention and concentration, executive functioning,
visual and verbal memory, memory retention, visual-spatial ability and language, as
well as selected emotional and functional self-report checklists.
Following completion of the assessment, all protocol scoring was completed by a
doctoral-level intern and outlined on a summary sheet. The final scores were reviewed
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by the licensed psychologist who determined the patient's diagnosis and outlined
treatment recommendations.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

A total ofN

85 participant files selected (in chronological order) from archival

data were identified for this study. The demographic breakdown for the study follows
below.

Demographics

A total of 44 males represented 51.8 percent of the data. A total of 41 females
represented 48.2 percent of the data files. Selected participants ranged in age from 18
years to 71 years. The mean age was 45.2 with a standard deviation of 8.6. The mean
education for the data set was 14.83 with a standard deviation of 3.00. The minimum
level of education in years was 8 years. The maximum level of education for the data set
was 22 years.
Participant files (n = 25) that contained the WAIS-III assessment measure yielded
a mean Full Scale IQ score of 105.7 with a standard deviation of 15.5. The minimum Full
Scale IQ was 80; the maximum Full Scale IQ was 136. Participant files (n = 58) that
contained the WASI assessment measure yielded a mean IQ score 105.9 with a standard
deviation of 15.1. . The minimum Full Scale IQ was 65; the maximum Full Scale IQ was
128.
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Presenting Complaints

Approximately one-third of patient data files selected presented with complaints
of different severity levels of traumatic brain injury. Table 1 outlines the breakdown of
patient complaints at the time of the referraL

Table 1

Frequency Distribution of Patient Presenting Complaints

Presenting Complaint

Number
_.....

%

_ __
......

.....

................

Traumatic Brain Injury

33

38.8

Acquired Brain Injury

21

24.7

Memory/Dementia

14

16.5

Developmental

12

14.1

Psychiatric

5

5.9

85

100

- - .....--......

.. ......

Total

~

PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 58

Diagnoses

Following a neuropsychological evaluation, approximately one-third of patient
data files that were identified met the criteria for traumatic brain injury. Table 2 outlines
the breakdown of patient diagnoses (derived from the neuropsychological report).

Table 2

Frequency Distribution ofPatient Diagnoses

Presenting Complaint

Number

%

Traumatic Brain Injury

30

35.3

Acquired Brain Injury

10

11.8

Memory/Dementia

22

25.9

Developmental

14

16.5

Psychiatric

9

10.6

Total

85

100
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Hypotheses and Findings

In assessing a patient's ability to report symptoms accurately (as measured by the
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale), as they relate to domains of neurological
impairment (as measured by neuropsychological tests) and the ability to accurately
evaluate accurately how well there is (sense of) control over (behavior and) environment
(as measured by the Perceived Control Across Domains Scale), the following hypotheses
were outlined.
Because of multiple comparisons, a Bonferroni Correction was run to guard
against inflation of the experiment-wise alpha (aln, where n denotes the number
(maximum number) of comparisons; for this study, 15). Thus, .05 alpha divided by 15 =
0.003 or (rounded to) 0.01. Thus, the alpha level was set at .01 as a threshold for
significance.

Hypothesis # 1

Lower scores on self-report of neurological impairment (as measured by the
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale) will be associated with higher levels of global
cognitive ability as measured by standardized assessment. An ANOV A addressed the
relationship between the NIS total score and cognitive assessment measures of Trails A
(F = .311), (and) Trails B (F = .678). A Pearson Product Moment Correlation addressed

perseverative responses on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (r = .038), Symbol Digit
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Modalities Test Oral (r = -.128) and Written (r = .170), and Full Scale IQ (r = .030). No
significant relationship was found between these variables,p > .01.

Hypothesis # 2

Higher scores on self-report of neurological impairment (as measured by the
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale) are associated with greater memory impairment.
A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between the total NIS score and
memory subtests of the WMS-R: both Verbal Retention (r = .071), and Visual
Retention (r = -.069), and recall scores of the RCFT: both three-minute (r = -.180) and
thirty-minute (r= -.089) delay tasks. No significant relationship was found between
these variables, p > .01.

Hypothesis # 3

Higher scores on self-report of neurological impairment (as measured by the
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale) are associated with greater language
impairment. A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between the NIS total
score and verbal memory subtests of the HVLT-R: Retention (r
-.145) tasks and scores on the verbal tasks of the COWAT (1'
Fluency (r
.01.

=

=

-.059) and Recall(r =

= -.094) and Semantic

-.057). No significant relationship was found between these variables, p >
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Hypothesis # 4

Higher scores on self-report of neurological impairment (as measured by the
Neuropsychological Impairment Scale) are associated with greater visual spatial and
constructional impairment. A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between
the NIS total score and spatial tasks consisting of the RCFT Copy task (r = -.057),
Judgment of Line Orientation (r = -.017) and the WASI Performance IQ score (r =
.062). No significant relationship was found between these variables,p > .01.

Hypothesis # 5

Intellectual functioning moderates self-report symptoms of neurological
impairment and overall global cognitive ability. A Partial Correlation was performed for
the number of perseveratory responses on the WSCT (r = .0082), Symbol Digit
Modalities Test: Written (r

=

-.0503) and Oral (r

=

-.0700) while controlling for WASI

Full Scale IQ scores. All were found to be non-significant (p > .01).

Hypothesis # 6

Lower scores on self-report on domains of perceived control (as measured by the
Perceived Control Across Domains Scale) will be associated with higher levels of
global cognitive ability as measured by standardized assessment. An ANOVA
addressed the relationship between the PCADS total score and cognitive assessment
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measures of Trails A (F = .311), Trails B (F

.678). A Pearson correlation addressed

perseverative responses on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (r =.-.142), Symbol Digit
Modalities Test Oral (r = -.046) and Written (r

.058), and Full Scale IQ (r = .083). No

significant relationship was found between these variables,p > .01.

Hypothesis # 7

Higher scores of self-report on domains of perceived control (as measured by the
Perceived Control Across Domains Scale) are associated with greater memory
impairment. A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between the PCADS total
score and memory subtests of the WMS-R: both Verbal Retention (r = .099), and Visual
Retention (1'

= -.033), and recall scores of the RCFT: both three-minute (1' = -.080) and

thirty-minute (r = -.082) delay tasks. No significant relationship was found between
these variables,p > .01.

Hypothesis # 8

Higher scores on self-report on domains of perceived control (as measured by the
Perceived Control Across Domains Scale) are associated with greater language
impairment. A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between the PCADS total
score and verbal memory subtests of the HVLT-R: Retention (r = -.001) and Recall
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(1'

= -.076) tasks, and scores on the verbal tasks of the COWAT (1' -.067) and

Semantic Fluency (1'

-.018). No significant relationship was found between these

variables, p > .01.

Hypothesis # 9

Higher scores on self-report on domains of perceived control (as measured by the
Perceived Control Across Domains Scale) are associated with greater visual spatial and
constructional impairment. A Pearson correlation addressed the relationship between
the PCADS total score and spatial tasks consisting ofthe RCFT Copy task (1'
Judgment of Line Orientation (1'

-.141),

-.025), and the WASI Performance IQ score (1'

-

.001). No significant relationship was found between these variables, p > .01.

Hypothesis # 10

Intellectual functioning moderates self-report symptoms of perceived control and
overall global cognitive ability. A Partial Correlation was performed for the number of
perseveratory responses on the WSCT (1' = -.0277), Symbol Digit Modalities Test:
Written (1'

= -.0350) and Oral (1' -.0456) while controlling for WASI Full Scale IQ

scores. All were found to be non-significant (p> .01).
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Hypothesis # 11

There is an association between higher scores of self-report on the Neurological
Impairment Scale and higher scores on the Perceived Control Across Domains Scale,
indicating that patients would accurately perceive themselves as having little personal
control over their lives, concurrently with brain injury. A One-Way ANOV A indicated
no significance between total scores of the PCADS and NIS (F= .183,p > .01). The
two scales were positively correlated (r = .635,p < .01).
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

Summary

This study examined a sample of patients from archival data files, who previously
presented with brain diseases and disorders of varying magnitudes of impainnent. Each
patient had been referred to a clinical practice for an evaluation of his or her
neuropsychological functioning. A total of 85 patient files were selected, based upon a
completed data set for the study.
Patients were divided according to presenting complaints and final diagnoses. The
first group was composed of individuals who had sustained traumatic brain injuries as
results of being involved in a motor vehicle accident, pedestrian accidents, falls resulting
in head injury, and mild, to moderate and severe TBI. The second group was composed
of patients who were referred for vague neurological complaints and neurocognitive
difficulties including seizure disorders, anoxic events, aphasia, tumors and cerebral
vascular accidents.
The memory and dementia group were referred for general and vague memory
concerns and complaints, patients who had multiple sclerosis, and cognitive complaints
because of possible dementia due to significant and previous alcohol abuse. Those adults,
who were categorized as having problems associated with developmental concerns,
reported problems with attention, concentration and focus, or had a prior diagnosis of
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attention disorders or disorders within the autistic spectrum. The remaining patients were
those who presented with psychiatric complaints, including Bipolar, Schizophrenia
(medication managed), anxiety and depression.
The purpose of the study was to explore whether or not a relationship would be
found between the patients' self-reports of perceived control (as measured by the
Perceived Control Across Domains [PCADS]), and their self-appraisals of
neuropsychological symptom severity (as measured by the Neuropsychological
Impairment Scale [NISJ), when compared with their actual assessment scores following
brain injury.
The author was interested in investigating the relationship between patients'
subjective self-reports as predictors of neuropsychological functioning. Findings
concluded the patients' self-appraisals on measures of self-report of neurological
symptoms and levels of severity, as well as the patients' perceptions of control over
behaviors and their environments, did not allow the predictions of patient performances
on standardized assessment measures. No consistency was found on checklists scores and
test performances within groups. Although some patients achieved better scores than they
expected, despite their self-reports to the contrary, others achieved poorer results when
compared with their own standardized assessment scores.
Total scores from the patients' self-endorsed checklists were compared with their
actual test scores across several cognitive areas of neuropsychological functioning,
including memory and attention, executive ability, and visual spatial constructional
abilities. From a statistical standpoint, because of multiple comparisons, a Bonfenoni
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Conection was run to in order to guard against the inflation of the experiment-wise alpha;
hence the alpha level was set at .01 as a threshold for significance.

Hypotheses Findings

The first hypothesis investigated whether or not lower scores (indicating that the
patient reported little to no impairment) on a self-report measure of neurological
impairment (as measured by the NIS), would be associated with higher levels of overall
cognitive ability. An ANOVA was performed to compare the patients' assessment scores
on Trails A, Trails B. A conelational analysis was performed on the number of
perseverative responses on WCST, and the SDMT (both written and oral).The results
found no significant relationship between the patients' self-reports of little to no
impairment in neurological symptoms as predictors of higher levels of overall global
cognitive impairment.
The second hypothesis investigated whether or not higher scores on the NIS
(indicating the patient reported greater levels of neurological symptom severity) would be
correlated with greater memory impairment. A Pearson Correlation was performed to
compare patients' self-reports with assessment scores as measured by the visual and
verbal memory retention scores of the WMS-R, and the 3-minute, and 30-minute recall
scores of the RCFT. The results found no significant relationship between patients'
reports of greater neurological difficulties as predictors of greater memory impairment.
The third hypothesis investigated whether or not higher scores on the NIS
(indicating greater levels of neurological symptom severity) would be associated with
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greater impairment in language. A Pearson Correlation was performed to compare
patients' self-reports with assessment scores retention and recall tasks of the HVLT-R,
and the scores on the COWAT, FAS and semantic fluency tasks. No significant
relationship was found between patients' self-reports of greater neurological difficulties
as predictors of greater language impairment.
The fourth hypothesis addressed the relationship between patients' higher scores
on self-reports of neurological impairment, and whether or not their reports of greater
impairment would be associated with greater impairment on tasks measuring visual
spatial and constructional ability. A Pearson Correlation was performed to compare
patients' subjective reports of greater impairment, and the RCFT copy task, lOLO, and
the Performance IQ scores on intellectual measures. Results found no significant
relationship between patients' self-reports of greater neurological impairment as
predictors of greater impairment in visual spatial and constructional ability.
The fifth hypothesis examined patients' overall self-reports of neurological
impairment and the relationship to overall global cognitive ability when controlling for
education. A Partial Correlation was performed while controlling for IQ. Results
indicated that the patients' responses were not moderated by IQ when partialed-out.
The sixth hypothesis investigated whether or not lower scores (indicating that
patients' perceived themselves to have more control) on the PCADS would be associated
with higher levels of global cognitive ability when compared with standardized
assessment scores. An ANOVA was performed to compare the patients' assessment
scores on Trails A, Trails B. A correlation was performed on the number of perseverative
responses on WCST and on the SDMT (both written and oral).Our results found no
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significant relationship between the patients' self-reports of little to no control over their
environments as predictors of higher levels of overall global cognitive impairment.
The seventh hypothesis investigated whether or not higher scores on the PCADS
(indicating that patients felt less control over their behavior and environment) were
associated with greater memory impairment. A Pearson Correlation was performed to
compare patients' self-reports of the amount of control that was perceived with
assessment scores, as measured by the visual and verbal memory retention scores of the
WMS-R, and the 3-minute, and 30-minute recall scores ofthe RCFT. The results found
no significant relationship between patients' reports of minimal to no control reports as
predictors of greater memory impairment.
The eighth hypothesis investigated the relationship between higher scores on the
PCADS and greater language impairment. A Pearson Correlation was performed to
compare patients' self-reports with assessment scores retention and recall tasks of the
HVLT-R, and the scores on the COWAT, FAS and semantic fluency tasks. No significant
relationship was found between patients' self-reports of little to no control as predictors
of greater language impairment.
1be ninth hypothesis investigated whether or not a relationship would be found
between higher scores on the PCADS and greater impairments in visual spatial and
constructional abilities. A Pearson Correlation was performed to compare patients'
subjective reports of greater impairment, and the RCFT copy task, JOLO, and the
Performance IQ score on intellectual measures. Results found no significant relationship
between patients' self-reports of minimal to any control as predictors of greater
impairment in visual spatial and constructional abilities.
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The tenth hypothesis addressed whether or not intellectual functioning moderated
self-report symptoms and global cognitive abilities. Partial conelations were
accomplished to determine the relationship between for the PSV total on the WCST, the
SDMT (Written and Oral) and the NIS total scores when controlling for IQ. All were
non-significant (p > .01).
The eleventh and final hypothesis investigated whether or not the difference in
self-reports addressing the domains of perceived control would differ, based upon gender,
age or diagnosis. No significant differences were found, based upon these findings.

Limitations of the study

Because this was an exploratory study utilizing existing data, the most obvious
limitation to the study was the sample size. We were not able to achieve sufficient
statistical power. A larger number of subjects may have contributed to a larger statistical
power; however, not all patient charts met the completed data set when selected for the
study. This was due predominantly to the individualized assessment protocol designed
according to patient complaint and age; therefore, some measures were not utilized.
Additionally, it should be noted that the correlations were found to be extremely
low. Had adequate power been achieved, the correlations may have been statistically
significant, but not clinically significant (for example, r

.20 would account for

approximately 4% of the sample).
Another limitation was the heterogeneity of the sample. Diagnostic categories
representing the patients' presenting complaints and final diagnoses were representative
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of that which one would expect to find in a clinical practice. However, there was
considerable heterogeneity within each category. Additionally, not all disorder were
represented equally within each category. For example, some clients were involved in
litigation involving lawsuits related to job injuries. Studies report that malingering is an
important factor of concern for patients involved in personal injury litigation, or other
scenarios in which benefits for compensation or disability are awarded (Nicholson &
Martelli, 2007). For this reason, generalizability of results would also a factor.
Different ethnicities were not identified in the study. This was due predominantly
to the use of existing data, on which ethnic demographics were not noted on the
assessment protocols.

Implications for research in the fie ld ofpsychology

Although the findings of this study were reported as not being significant, some
implications for the future research in the field were noted. First, the representative
sample clientele examined for this study is a more representative group of the kind of
patients that many neuropsychologists might encounter in private practice, unless there is
a specialization of a particular disorder or disease.
The study did not find an expected discrepancy in scores as a predictor of the
patient's perception of cognitive impairment. Rather, the study found that patients did not
reliably predict their own level of cognitive impairment on self-report measures. This was
surprising, given the literature on the assessment of patients with deficits following
neurological insult. Research indicates that the most conventional manner in which to
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measure patient awareness of self is through the comparison of the patient's self-report
with standardized neuropsychological measures (Flashman & McAllister, 2002; Fleming
et al., 1996; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Findings concluded that patients with deficits in
awareness tend to rate their abilities as better than the standard, and the discrepancy
between the self-perception of abilities and actual scores is said to be the measure of the
level of unawareness (Hart et al., 2004; Sherer, et al., 1998b).
More studies utilizing the PCADS in different sample populations would be
beneficial. There is also the possibility that the construct of perceived control in assessing
a patient's level of impairment may be minimally associated or completely unrelated.
Also, the question arises about whether or not the presence of severe cognitive
impairment is or is not related to how intensely a patient is able to perceive a sense
control over behaviors and personal enviromnents. Studies by Thompson on perceived
control (1981) emphasized the fact that control needs only to be perceived in order to be
effective. Given these patients' inability to predict their own levels of impairment
reliably, this fact may not hold true for patients with neurological insult.
Toglia and Kirk (2000) described metacognitive knowledge as declarative
knowledge concerning one's own abilities. Disruption of these functions have been found
to interrupt the ability to appraise one's abilities accurately, including the ability to obtain
a sense of control over his/her behaviors and the environment Therefore, it is also
possible that the PCADS would be more appropriately utilized as a more sensitive
evaluative measure for complex metacognitive processes. This might include such
higher-level metacognitive functions as the ability to self-appraise one's feelings about
one's own behaviors and across domains of everyday living.

PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 73

The need for accurate psychological assessment is imperative, given the
importance of evaluating not only the patient's level of functioning, but also the patient's
perception of his or her ability to control and manage the environment. This discrepancy
between a patient's perception of his or her behaviors, abilities and management of the
environment compared with his or her actual ability has been seen, for example, in
individual who have been referred for neuropsychological assessment to return to work or
resume driving activities.
With the rising cost of insurance, companies have encouraged modified
assessment protocols which focus on a minimal number of assessment measures, relying
heavily on clinical interviews. The use of structured interviews relies heavily on the
patients' abilities to comprehend questions verbally, and to convey their understanding of
their deficits verbally (Flashman & McAllister, 2002). Given the findings of this study, if
patients are unable to report symptoms reliably, or to perceive their levels of control over
daily functions unreliably, the question remains about how clinicians can reliably
diagnose them. The need for structured self-report measures and a robust
neuropsychological battery accessing domains of cognitive abilities is imperative for the
accurate assessment, diagnosis, identification of functional limitations and
recommendations for rehabilitation and treatment.

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy

Although no relationship was found for the NIS and the PCADS to predict scores
on cognitive measures, both checklists could easily be utilized within the assessment
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setting to assist not only with reporting neurological symptom severity, but also with
reporting the patients' thoughts about the amount of security they feel in controlling their
environments following neurological insult. Within the assessment setting, not only
would the checklists provide additional information to supplement the clinical interview,
but also give a subjective overview to supplement patient complaint not otherwise
mentioned or questioned by the clinician.
Research suggests that impaired self-awareness was related to treatment
outcome, length of stay, treatment compliance, and the establishment ofa working
alliance in therapy (Anderson et al. 1999; Prigatano 2005). Sherer and his colleagues
(1998b) reported that the functional outcomes of treatment objectives were impeded by
the patient's inability to choose appropriate long-term goals accurately because of deficits
in awareness. As a result of incompatible goals, patients often experience repeated
failures over time which increases their level of frustration (Prigatano, 2005).
Within the therapeutic arena, the establishment of a strong therapeutic alliance
during psychotherapy could be established more quickly when patients have the chance
to fill out checklists that address subjective experience and complaint This would also
provide a segue into conversation about such thoughts that may not readily be apparent
during the first few sessions.
In both cases, the infonnation gamered from these checklists would assist in
creating effective treatment plans that are specific to the problematic domains reported by
the patient. Beyond the treatment plan, both checklists could be utilized for periodic
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reevaluation in order to determine whether or not patients were making progress over
time, both in their subjective evaluations of symptom reports, and in the perceptions of
their regained control over their environments.

Future Directions

The current study examined some of the issues involved in this type of
exploratory study within a clinical practice. It would be beneficial to design a study that
would incorporate a larger sample size. Further, it may be more advantageous to study
one group at a time, in which patients were equally represented across groups. This, in
turn, this would promote more effective generalizability. Additionally, because
demographics for age, gender and education were incorporated, more cross-cultural
studies are needed; therefore, it would be beneficial to observe different ethnic groups
within the various groups of patients who sustain neurological insult.
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PCADS
(Perceived Control Across Domains Scale)
Copyright, 2004, Beth Arbum Davis
Instructions for completing tlte Perceived Control Across Domains Scale: After
carefully reading each group of statements, circle the response (0,1,2, or 3) that best
describes the way you feel.

1. Activities of daily living:
o- I almost never have problems doing things for myself such as eating,
dressing, or bathing.
1I sometimes have problems doing things for myself such as eating,
dressing, or bathing.
2I often have problems doing everyday activities for myself such as eating,
dressing, or bathing.
3I almost always have problems doing everyday activities for myself such
as eating, dressing, or bathing.
2. Self care:
0I am always careful about my health.
1I am often careful about my health.
I sometimes am careful about my health.
2I am never careful about my health.
33. Goals:

01-

23-

I almost never have problems achieving my goals.
I sometimes have problems achieving my goals.
I often have problems achieving my goals.
I almost always have problems achieving my goals.

4. Food intake:
o- I never have problems with the amount of food I eat.
1I often have problems with the amount of food I eat.
2I sometimes have problems with the amount of food I eat.
3I almost always have problems with the amount of food I eat.

PERCEIVED CONTROL AND SELF-AWARENESS 77

5. Substance use:
o- I never have problems with drug or alcohol use.
I sometimes have problems with drug or alcohol use.
1I often have problems drug or alcohol use.
2I almost always have problems with drug or alcohol use.
36. Thought processes:
0I almost always change the way I think, if doing so would help me.
I often change the way I think, if doing so would help me.
12I sometimes change the way I think, if doing so would help me.
3I never change the way I think, even if doing so would help me.
7. Aggressive behavior:
o- I never think of myself as aggressive.
1I sometimes think of myself as aggressive.
I often think of myself as aggressive.
23I almost always think of myself as aggressive.
8. Future:

0123-

I always think of myself as optimistic.
I often think of myself as optimistic.
I sometimes think of myself as optimistic.
I almost never think of myself as optimistic.

9. Emotional expression:
0I never have problems like yelling or throwing things when I'm angry or
frustrated.
I sometimes have problems like yelling or throwing things when I'm
1angry or frustrated.
I often have problems like yelling or throwing things when I'm angry
2or frustrated.
3I almost always have problems like yelling or throwing things when I'm
angry or frustrated.
10. Family relationships:
0I never have problems with family relationships.
I sometimes have problems with family relationships.
12I often have problems with family relationships.
I almost always have problems with family relationships.
3-
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11. Impulsive behavior:
o- I never have thoughts, images, or impulses that I can't put a stop to.
I I sometimes have thoughts, images, or impulses that I can't put a stop to.
2I often have thoughts, images, or impUlses that I can't put a stop to.
3I almost always have thoughts, images, or impulses that I can't put a stop
to.
12. Worlilschool relationships:
o- I almost never have problems with people at work or school.
II sometimes have problems with people at work or school.
2I often have problems with people at work or school.
3I almost always have problems with people at work or school.
13. My environment:
o
I almost always think I am able to influence people around me.
II often think I am able to influence people around me.
I sometimes think I am able to influence people around me.
2I never think I am able to influence people around me.
314. Self-injurious behavior:
0I never have problems with wanting to harm myself.
II sometimes have problems with wanting to harm myself.
2I often have problems with wanting to harm myself.
3I almost always have problems with wanting to harm myself
15. Social relationships:
0I almost never have problems with people when I'm in a social situation.
1I sometimes have problems with people when I'm in a social situation.
2
I often have problems with people when I'm in a social situation.
3
I almost always have problems with people when I'm in a social situation.
16. Physical sensations:
o- I always am able to relieve physical discomfOli when I have it.
1
I often am able to relieve physical discomfort when I have it.
2I sometimes am able to relieve physical discomfort when I have it.
3I rarely am able to relieve physical discomfort when I have it.
17. Finances:
01
23

Name:

I never have problems with spending too much money.
I sometimes have problems with spending too much money.
I often have problems with spending too much money.
I almost always have problems with spending too much money.

Date:
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N.I.S.
Below is a list of problems which some people have. Some of them describe their
experiences during the past few days or weeks. Others refer to their life-time experiences.
Please read each one carefully and ask yourself how much that statements applies to you.
Then, to the left of that statement, circle the number that shows how much the statement
applies to you, from "Not At All" to "Extremely." Answer every item to the best of your
ability. Do not spend a great deal of time on anyone item.
Responses: 0 Not at all; 1 = A little bit; 2 = Moderately; 3
4 Extremely.

Quite a bit;

0

1

2

3

4

1. I am forgetful.

0

1

2

3

4

2. I bump into things.

0

1

2

3

4

3. I get tired easily.

0

1

2

3

4

4. My mind works slowly.

0

1

2

3

4

5. My hearing has become worse.

0

123

4

6. I have trouble writing sentences.

0

1 2

3

4

7. I often feel sad and blue.

0

1

2

3

4

8. My words get mixed up.

0

1 2

3

4

9. I have trouble following conversations.

0

1 2

3

4

10. I like everyone I kno

0

1

2

3

4

.0

1

2

3

4

11. I check and double check everything I do.
_ _ ...
12. I faint sometimes.

0

1

2

3

4

13. Part of my body is paralyzed.

0

1

2

3

4

14. I drop things frequently.

0

1

2

3

4

15. I have serious memory problems.

0

1

2

3

4

16. I have trouble walking.

0

1

2

3

4

17. I feel quite discouraged about my future.

0

1 2

3

4

18. My eyesight has become worse.

3

4

19. I have trouble getting organized.

3

4

20. I am always right.

I

..

!o 1 2 3 4
0

1 2

3

4

..

21. I forget what I'm saying.
23. My thinking becomes blocked.

!
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0

1 2

3

4

24. I fall down sometimes.

0

1

2

3

4

0

1 2

3

4

25. I have forgotten many things which happened in my
childhood.
26. My hands shake and tremble.

0

1

2

3

4

27. I tend to worry all the time.

0

1

2

3

4

28. My muscles twitch and jump.

0

1

2

3

4

29. I am very clumsy.

0

1 2

3

4

30. I am always happy.

0

1 2

3

4

31. I have trouble with the left side of my body.

0

1

2

3

4

32. I have trouble learning new things.

0

1

2

3

4

33. I get confused easily.

0

1

2

3

4

34. I often lose things.

0

1 2

3

4

35. I have forgotten much of what I have learned in school.

0

1 2

3

4

36. My mind frequently goes blank.

0

1

2

3

4

37. I think about death and dying often.

0

1

2

3

4

38. My health is getting worse.

0

1 2

3

4

39. I have difficulty making decisions.

0

1

2

3

4

40. I always do the right thing.

0

1

2

3

4

41. My speech has become worse.

0

1

2

3

4

42. I feel frustrated quite often.

0

1 2

3

4

43. I have trouble spelling.

0

1

2

3

4

44. I have a hard time remembering people's names.

0

1

2

3

4

45. I have been knocked unconscious.

0

1 2

3

4

46. Part of my body feels numb.

0

1 2

3

4

47. I often feel lonely and isolated.

0

1

2

3

4

48. I have had a head injury.

0

1

2

3

4

49. My handwriting has become worse.

0

1

2

3

4

50. I always tell the truth.
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